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INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Colorado Department of Health issued the Adolph
Coors Brewing Company a $1.05 million fine, the largest penalty in
the Department’s history, for spilling beer during Coors’s brewing
and treatment process.1 In 2012, a jury awarded Wayne Watson a
$7.2 million verdict against the manufacturer and distributor of his
favorite microwavable popcorn, successfully holding both companies
liable for the development of his respiratory illness.2 Separated by
nearly a decade, these two incidents are connected by millions of
invisible particles. Those particles constitute the bases of both
Colorado’s fine against Coors—specifically the particles’ detrimental
effect on outdoor air quality3—and Mr. Watson’s windfall—the cause
of his life-altering condition.4 They are known as volatile organic
compounds (VOCs).
VOCs are everywhere and harmless at normal levels.5 Yet,
researchers consistently find them in exponentially higher con-
centrations indoors than outdoors.6 When exposed to these high
concentrations, individuals can suffer from a plethora of negative
health effects.7 Recent research has indicated that personal compu-
ters and printers are among the many sources of indoor VOC
emissions.8 Despite this research and the known dangers of VOC
1. See Jennifer M. Porter et al., Recent Developments in Energy Resources Law, 30 TORT
& INS. L.J. 340, 341 (1995).
2. See Anthony Castellano, “Popcorn Lung” Lawsuit Nets $7.2M Award, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/09/popcorn-lung-lawsuit-nets-7-
2m-award/ [http://perma.cc/F8ZD-TQFP].
3. See Porter, supra note 1, at 341.
4. Castellano, supra note 2.
5. See Ehsanul Kabir & Ki-Hyun Kim, A Review of Some Representative Techniques for
Controlling Indoor Volatile Organic Compounds, 6 ASIAN J. ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 137, 138
(2012).
6. See An Introduction to Indoor Air Quality, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/iaq/voc.html [http://perma.cc/A644-U8BT] (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“Con-
centrations of many VOCs are consistently higher indoors (up to ten times higher) than
outdoors.... EPA’s office of Research and Development[ ] ... found levels of about a dozen
common organic pollutants to be 2 to 5 times higher inside homes than outside.”).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.B.
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emissions in indoor environments,9 the government does not cur-
rently regulate them. Instead, the scope of federal VOC emission
regulation is limited by the concern for outdoor air quality and in-
door industrial settings.10 Considering the average person in the
United States spends approximately 90 percent of his or her time
indoors,11 this regulatory gap must be filled in a way that protects
health interests and prevents degradation of indoor air quality, even
if that end is accomplished under the guise of promulgating outdoor
air quality standards, a more traditional focus of environmental
regulation.12
To provide an elementary understanding of VOCs, Part I of this
Note explains VOCs in greater detail and summarizes the contem-
porary research linking electronic appliances to their emissions.
Part II investigates the traditional legislative intent behind VOC
regulation while probing the shortcomings of the statutes that di-
rectly and indirectly authorize those regulations. Part III proposes
an amendment to the Clean Air Act, the Cumulatively Dangerous
Air Pollutant Amendment, which would expand the scope of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) authority to monitor
VOCs and indoor air quality. Part IV details the many benefits that
would result from granting the EPA this power. Lastly, Part V of
this Note acknowledges and dismisses common counterarguments
to public-health-oriented amendments as well as the consequential
regulations.
This Note is unique in that it addresses recent scientific develop-
ments concerning VOC emission rates from electronics and their
impact on human health. Within the past decade, only one federal
agency has attempted to increase its regulatory power with respect
to indoor air quality.13 That unsuccessful proposal directly ad-
dressed the issue of emissions from appliances,14 but relied on
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part II. 
11. OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON INDOOR AIR QUALITY VOLUME II: ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL OF INDOOR AIR POLLU-
TION, at i (1989). This is a dated source, but a more contemporary estimate was not found.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See Indoor Air Quality, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968 (Apr. 5, 1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928). 
14. Id.
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generalized findings contemporary research, identifying specific
levels and origins of indoor VOC emissions.15 That proposal has
since become antiquated. Outside of this Note, no academic attempt
has been made to effectuate a change within the Clean Air Act that
would allow regulations on emissions of electronic appliances in
both industrial and nonindustrial settings. Regulation of indoor air
quality in nonindustrial settings is particularly important in the
twenty-first century, when Americans spend minimal time outdoors,
and when the quest for cleaner air could result in healthier, more
productive people.
I. VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS
The definition of “Volatile Organic Compound” varies depending
on the context. Apart from explaining what “VOC” means, this Part
briefly delves into common VOC sources, their effects on health,
and, paramount of all, the progression of research that identifies
certain electronic appliances as definitive producers of VOC emis-
sions.
A. What Are Volatile Organic Compounds?
Scientifically defined, a VOC is any “chemical compound that con-
tains at least one carbon [atom] and a hydrogen atom in its molec-
ular structure .... [whose] boiling point [ ] ranges between 50°C and
260°C.”16 The legal definition of a VOC narrows that broad classifi-
cation, albeit slightly. According to the Code of Federal Regulations,
a VOC is “any compound of carbon, excluding carbon monoxide,
carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, and
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. A.P. Jones, Indoor Air Quality and Health, 33 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 4535, 4547 (1999);
see also JONATHAN WILLIAMS & RALF KOPPMANN, Volatile Organic Compounds in the Atmo-
sphere: An Overview, in VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS IN THE ATMOSPHERE 1, 1 (Ralf
Koppmann ed., 2007) (“VOCs are considered to be those organic compounds having a vapour
pressure greater than 10 Pa at 25°C, a boiling point of up to 260°C at atmospheric pressure,
and 15 or less carbon atoms.”).
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ammonium carbonate, which participates in atmospheric photo-
chemical reactions.”17
The EPA’s Indoor Air Quality Guide for Health Professionals
provides an even more user-friendly definition of VOCs: chemical
compounds that “[a]t room temperature, ... emitted as gases from
certain solids or liquids.”18 That guide continues to explain that
thousands of products used during “home, office, [and] school ...
activities” emit VOCs.19 Some of the more common sources of VOCs
are perfumes, hair sprays, finishes, rug and oven cleaners, paints,
lacquers, paint strippers, pesticides, building materials, home
furnishings, copiers, printers, correction fluids, glues, and even
permanent markers.20 Clearly, VOCs are everywhere.
Overexposure to VOCs can result in a variety of symptoms whose
spectrum ranges from minor annoyances to lethal reactions.
Included in that spectrum are eye, nose, and throat irritations,
headaches, nausea, vomiting, and even death.21 Particularly
disturbing is the fact that most VOCs are invisible and odorless, and
humans are unable to detect their presence.22 Consequently, many
products that emit VOCs carry precautionary labels and instruc-
tions for procedures of safe use.23
B. Consumer Appliances as Sources of VOC Emissions
Traditionally, outdoor air pollution has been at the epicenter of
media-driven environmental disputes, and as a result, the primary
17. 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(s) (2014). A photochemical reaction is a chemical reaction initiated
by the absorption of energy in the form of light. Jack R. Plimmer, Principle of Photodecompo-
sition of Pesticides, in DEGRADATION OF SYNTHETIC ORGANIC MOLECULES IN THE BIOSPHERE
280 (1971).
18. See AM. LUNG ASS’N ET AL., INDOOR AIR POLLUTION: AN INTRODUCTION FOR HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS 13 (1994), available at http://perma.cc/3S4X-RX99.
19. Id. 
20. Id. Other authorities list combustion appliances and potable water as sources of VOCs.
See Jones, supra note 16, at 4547-48.
21. See AM. LUNG ASS’N ET AL., supra note 18, at 13 (discussing other symptoms, such as
conjunctional irritation, allergic reactions, dyspnea, declines in serum cholinesterase levels,
epistaxis, fatigue and dizziness).
22. See Thomas F. Icard, Jr. & Wm. Cary Wright, Sick Building Syndrome and Building-
Related Illness Claims Defining the Practical and Legal Issues, 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 26, 26
(1994).
23. See AM. LUNG ASS’N ET AL., supra note 18, at 13.
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focus of environmental research.24 However, starting in the 1980s,
the scientific community began shifting its attention to the air
people breathe inside of buildings.25 Most of those early studies ex-
amined Sick Building Syndrome, a phenomena that occurs when the
pollution levels inside a building increase to the point that the
building itself becomes unhealthy and dangerous to its occupants.26
Accordingly, early researchers conducted their tests in active office
buildings, making it difficult to identify single sources of air pollu-
tion with any degree of certainty.27 For example, in 1991, research-
ers exploring the onset of Sick Building Syndrome experienced by
approximately 2700 workers conducted field tests in 41 office
buildings.28 The primary conclusion of that study was that “photo-
copying was related to nasal irritation, and video display terminal
work [was related] to eye symptoms, headaches, and lethargy.”29
More recent studies, conducted in laboratory settings, surpass
those generalized findings and identify specific pollutant sources
while quantifying the resulting emissions levels.30 These contem-
24. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, AIR POLLUTION: WORLD’S WORST
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK (2014) available at http://perma.cc/742A-NYKJ (focusing on
reducing global outdoor air pollution); Press Release, Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer,
World Health Org., Outdoor Air Pollution a Leading Environmental Cause of Cancer Deaths
(Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/G99L-UWKG (focusing on the adverse health
effects from outdoor air pollution).
25. See, e.g., Christine A. Erdmann & Michael G. Apte, Mucous Membrane and Lower
Respiratory Building Related Symptoms in Relation to Indoor Carbon Dioxide Concentrations
in the 100-Building BASE Dataset, 14 INDOOR AIR 127 (2004).
26. See David Reisman, Strict Liability and Sick Building Syndrome: Defining a Building
as a Product Under Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 35, 35 (1995). Buildings are diagnosed as “sick” when 20 percent or more of their
occupants suffer from the same symptoms, stemming from an unknown cause for at least two
weeks, and those symptoms dissipate after exiting the building in question. See Steven A.
Loewy et al., Indoor Pollution in Commercial Buildings: Legal Requirements and Emerging
Trends, 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 239, 245 (1992).
27. Loewy et al., supra note 26, at 239; Reisman, supra note 26, at 35-36.
28. Maritta S. Jaakkola & Jouni J.K. Jaakkola, Office Equipment & Supplies: A Modern
Occupational Health Concern?, 150 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1223, 1223 (1999).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Even these contemporary studies suffer from experimental limitations and can be
improved upon to produce more concrete results. See S.C. Lee et al., Characterization of VOCs,
Ozone, and PM10 Emissions from Office Equipment in an Environmental Chamber, 36
BUILDING & ENV’T 837, 842 (2001) (“Each of the ... pollutants associated with office equipment
has the potential to cause adverse effects .... It is essential to investigate the root cause of
emissions in order to reduce the emission, but it is rather difficult to examine all the possible
factors which affect the pollutant emission from office equipment since different machines and
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porary studies found that computers,31 photocopy machines,32 and
printers33 emit potentially dangerous volumes of VOCs.34 One of the
studies that quantified emission levels from personal computers
even correlated exposure to the relevant VOCs with a perception of
degraded air quality, negative health effects, and a decrease in work
performance.35
Although VOC emissions from electronic equipment are low when
compared to other sources of pollutants,36 such as building mater-
ials, they have a magnified impact on human health.37 Such
emissions lead to high VOC concentrations in poorly circulated
environments, thereby creating high-risk situations.38 Accordingly,
people’s close proximity to office equipment can result in higher
personal exposures than would be estimated from pollutant
concentrations in well-ventilated buildings.39 Low levels of VOCs
processes give a wide range of emission levels. Even for the same machine model, the emission
levels would be affected by other factors such as age, product history, maintenance cycle, air
exchange rates, and product loading.”).
31. Z. Bakó-Biró et al., Effects of Pollution from Personal Computers on Perceived Air
Quality, SBS Symptoms and Productivity in Offices, 14 INDOOR AIR 178, 178, 185 (2004); see
also K. Hoshino et al., Measurement of SVOCs Emitted from Building Materials and Electric
Appliances Using Thermal Desorption Test Chamber Method, in 1 HEALTHY BUILDINGS 2003,
at 474, 476 (Tham Kwok Wai et al. eds., 2003); T. Nakagawa et al., Chemical Emission Rates
from Personal Computers, in 1 HEALTHY BUILDINGS 2003, supra, at 468.
32. See S.K. Brown, Assessment of Pollutant Emissions from Dry-Process Photocopiers, 9
INDOOR AIR 259 (1999); Kelly Leovic et al., Evaluation of a Test Method for Measuring Indoor
Air Emissions from Dry-Process Photocopiers, 48 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 915, 915-16
(1998).
33. See Lee et al., supra note 30; T. Smola et al., Health Hazards from Laser Printers, 62
AIR QUALITY CONTROL 295 (2002).
34. See Lee et al., supra note 30, at 837 (“The consequence of the extensive use of modern
office equipment is that office workers are exposed to an office climate giving rise to health
effects such as headache; mucous irritation and dryness in the eyes, nose and throat; and dry
and tight facial skin. Researchers ... reported that the operation of office equipment not only
contribute to increase in indoor air pollution concentrations, but also, in some cases, has been
associated with health complaints from exposed workers.”).
35. See Bakó-Biró et al., supra note 31, at 178.
36. Hugo Destaillats et al., Indoor Pollutants Emitted by Office Equipment: A Review of
Reported Data and Information Needs, 42 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 1371, 1371-86 (2008).
37. See Sandra J. McBride et al., Investigations of the Proximity Effect for Pollutants in
the Indoor Environment, 9 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 602, 602 (1999). 
38. Id.; Reisman, supra note 26, at 36-37.
39. Destaillats et al., supra note 36, at 1385 (“Personal exposure to pollutants emitted
from office equipment may be enhanced due to a proximity effect where users remain close
to a source for an extended duration.”); see also McBride et al., supra note 37, at 603.
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also combine with other commonly present indoor chemicals,
triggering the creation of additional pollutants that result in
harmful indoor environments.40
To date, no study has examined VOC emissions from televisions,
media players, or gaming devices. Similarly, no studies have mea-
sured VOC concentrations in residential buildings or quantified the
impact that poor indoor air quality has on nonindustrial persons.
Despite that lack of scientific patronage, previous studies suggest
that those alternate electronic appliances are likely sources of VOC
emissions and that high VOC concentrations in residential buildings
have a negative impact on building occupants.
II. TRADITIONAL LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND VOC EMISSION
REGULATION
Two government agencies currently regulate VOC emissions—the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration (OSHA). This Part discusses the
legislative materials authorizing those regulations and identifies
their specific shortcomings in controlling VOCs. Also included in
this Part is an explanation of the Toxic Substances Control Act,
which does not authorize VOC regulation, but exemplifies the cur-
rent limitations on environmental legislation and the federal
recognition that the government must implement proactive ap-
proaches to promote healthy air quality standards.
A. The Clean Air Act
The EPA is required to develop national air quality standards
under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the primary source of federal law
regulating VOC emissions.41
40. Hugo Destaillats et al., Indoor Secondary Pollutants from Household Product
Emissions in the Presence of Ozone: A Bench-Scale Chamber Study, 40 ENVTL. SCI. TECH.
4421, 4427 (2006) (“This laboratory investigation illustrates the potential impact of ozone-
initiated chemistry involving constituents of common household products and leading to the
formation of secondary gaseous pollutants and particles.”).
41. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012); see JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, CLEAN AIR ACT: A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR
REQUIREMENTS 5-6 (2011).
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1. National Ambient Air Quality Standards
With the inception of the CAA in 1963, Congress recognized that
the “growth ... of air pollution brought about by urbanization,
industrial development, and ... use of motor vehicles, [had] resulted
in mounting dangers to [ ] public health and welfare.”42 Accordingly,
one of the identified purposes of the CAA was to protect public
health and welfare by developing a national program to prevent and
control air pollution.43
As Congress passed amendments to the CAA, the national pro-
gram’s requirements evolved in complexity. The 1967 CAA Amend-
ments ordered states to create Air Quality Control Regions, adopt
air quality standards for specific pollutants, and develop a state
implementation plan (SIP) to achieve those air quality standards.44
Initially, the federal government played a minor role in monitoring
state air quality.45 However, the federal government’s oversight
increased exponentially with each amendment to the CAA.46
For the purposes of this Note, the creation of the National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and the subsequent classifica-
tions of pollutants are the most important of these developments.47
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2).
43. See id. § 7401(b)(1)-(2). The other identified purposes of the CAA include initiating and
accelerating a national research and development program to prevent air pollution, providing
technical and financial assistance to the states to aid in air pollution prevention, and
encouraging the development of regional air pollution and control programs. Id. § 7401(b)(3)-
(4).
44. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485.
45. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation
Plans—Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 211 (2004)
(“The federal government did not set the air quality standards nor did it have much control
over the development of an implementation plan.”).
46. Since the CAA’s enactment in 1963, Pub. L. No. 8-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), the CAA
has been amended several times. The most significant changes occurred in 1970, 1977, and
1990. History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/
caa/ amendments.html [http://perma.cc/SV8J-HKLG] (last updated Aug. 15, 2013); see also
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012)); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(2012)).
47. The Clean Air Act of 1970 established National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
History of the Clean Air Act, supra note 46.
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Sections 108 and 109 of the CAA outline the procedures needed to
create the NAAQS.48 First, the EPA must identify pollutants that
“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare” and whose “presence ... in the ambient air results from
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”49 These “criteria
pollutants” are then evaluated and classified as either “primary” or
“secondary.”50 The distinction between the two categories involves
the intended subject, or subjects, of protection. Primary NAAQS
protect public health,51 and secondary NAAQS protect, or at least
prevent harm to, public welfare.52 When a criteria pollutant’s levels
exceed those of the NAAQS in a particular region, that region is
classified as a nonattainment area.53 Once this happens, the region’s
state must modify its SIP to reflect the actions it intends to take to
lower the pollutant’s levels.54
The EPA does not classify, and therefore does not regulate, VOCs
as criteria pollutants.55 If the EPA reclassified VOCs as criteria pol-
lutants,56 then any attempt to regulate VOC emissions from elec-
tronics would become moot—states would already be monitoring
such activity at some level to maintain their SIPs. This change
seems unlikely considering the EPA’s categorization of VOCs is
guided by one factor, their potential to produce ground-level ozone.
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7408.
49. Id. § 7408.
50. Id. § 7409(a).
51. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
52. Id. § 7409(b)(2). This section states that secondary standards “protect the public
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such
air pollutant in the ambient air.” Id. Later in the Act, “welfare” is defined as “effects on soils,
water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and
climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as
effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being.” Id. § 7602(h).
53. Id. § 7407(d)(1).
54. Id. § 7410.
55. Id. § 7409. The six criteria pollutants are sulfur dioxide, ozone, lead, particulate
matter, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide. See National Primary and Secondary Ambient
Air Quality Standards, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (Oct. 5, 1978); What Are the Six Common Air
Pollutants?, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa/gov.air/urbanair/ [http://perma.
cc/UTD8-RMXF] (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
56. VOCs would most likely be categorized as a primary NAAQS because they pose no
recognized threat to public welfare, only public health. See supra notes 50-52 and accom-
panying text.
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Ground-level ozone is one of the criteria pollutants and has
associated primary NAAQS.57 Although Congress did not include the
term “volatile organic compound” in the CAA until the 1990 amend-
ments,58 it mentioned “organic matter” as a potential threat to
public health as early as 1977.59 This is significant because the EPA
has distinguished between two types of VOCs since that decade:
negligibly reactive compounds, which are exempted from CAA
regulation because they have minimal effects on ozone creation, and
reactive compounds, which are regulated because of their propensity
to form ozone.60 The possibility that negligibly reactive compounds,
or even significantly reactive compounds, could be a danger to public
health before converting to ozone has not been considered.61
Section 183(e) of the CAA further required the EPA to conduct a
study of VOC emissions from consumer and commercial products
and determine their potential contribution to ozone formation.62 The
results of that study were then used to establish methods of regu-
lating the products responsible for at least 80 percent of the VOC
emission levels in nonattainment areas.63 Consequently, the EPA
codified national standards for VOC emissions from automobile re-
finish coatings,64 architectural coatings,65 consumer products,66 and
57. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(s) (2013).
58. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 182(a)(3)(B), 104 Stat.
2399, 2427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
59. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 122(a), 91 Stat. 685, 720
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
60. See Interim Guidance on Control of Volatile Organic Compounds in Ozone State
Implementation Plans, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,046, 54,047 (Sept. 13, 2005).
61. Many scholars attribute the adverse health effects associated with VOC exposure to
ozone exposure. Compare AM. LUNG ASS’N ET AL., supra note 18, at 1 (discussing the health
effects of prolonged exposure to VOCs), with Deborah Behles, Examining the Air We Breathe:
EPA Should Evaluate Cumulative Impacts When It Promulgates National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 200, 209 (2010) (linking ground level ozone exposure to
“a variety of adverse health impacts, including aggravated asthma, increased bronchitis, and
problems with the lower and upper respiratory systems”). 
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(e)(2)(A) (2012).
63. Id. § 7511(b)(e)(3)(A).
64. National Volatile Organic Compound Emission Standards for Automobile Refinish
Coatings, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,806 (Sept. 11, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 59).
65. National Volatile Organic Compound Emission Standards for Architectural Coatings,
63 Fed. Reg. 48,848 (Sept. 11, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 59).
66. National Volatile Organic Compound Emission Standards for Consumer Products, 63
Fed. Reg. 48,819 (Sept. 11, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 59).
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aerosol coatings.67 After sufficiently reducing the initial 80 percent
of VOC emissions, the sources responsible for the remaining 20
percent of emissions would become more important and worthy of
regulation. Emissions resulting from electronic and indoor appli-
ances could potentially be included in that 20 percent, but there is
no way of knowing when those regulations would be deemed
necessary under the current CAA provisions. Because there is no
way of knowing when that reduction might happen, this would be
an ineffective means of regulating VOC emissions from electronic
appliances.
2. Regulating Hazardous Air Pollutants
Separate from the development and enforcement of NAAQS are
the regulations promulgated to further section 112 of the CAA, the
final section authorizing EPA regulation of VOC emissions. Specific-
ally, that section calls for the legal control of hazardous air pollut-
ants (HAPs).68 Before enacting the 1990 CAA Amendments, the EPA
defined a HAP as “an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality
standard is applicable and which ... causes, or contributes to, air pol-
lution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase
in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible, illness.”69 Similar to the development of the NAAQS,
HAP regulation has evolved in complexity and comprehensiveness
over the years.70
According to the EPA, individuals exposed to HAPs have an
increased risk of experiencing “neurological, reproductive, ...
developmental, respiratory, and other health problems.”71 Easily
recognizable dangerous substances, such as arsenic, cyanide, and
mercury, are included in the 150 compounds currently classified as
67. National Volatile Organic Compound Emission Standards for Aerosol Coatings, 73
Fed. Reg. 66,184 (Nov. 7, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 59).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
69. Id. § 7412(a)(1) (1988). Currently, a HAP is defined as “any air pollutant listed
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.” § 7412(a)(6) (2012).
70. For a thorough history of HAP regulation, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Randy Lowell,
Control of Hazardous Air Pollution, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 229 (2001).
71. What Are the Health and Environmental Effects of Toxic Air Pollutants?, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/allabout.html [http://perma.cc/JGD2-3E6T]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
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HAPs.72 But that list also includes obscure substances that are also
VOCs, including glycol ethers, methyl chloride, and benzene.73 SIPs
regulate some of these VOCs, which inadvertently promotes
NAAQs.74 It is worth noting that little is known regarding the effect
that HAPs, including the listed VOCs, have on human health
outside of carcinogenic properties.75 Considering that studies have
linked VOCs to a multitude of conditions and symptoms other than
cancer, this limited knowledge base seems counterintuitive.76
In addition to HAP classifications, section 112 requires the EPA
to develop a list of categories of major sources and area sources
emitting one or more of the identified hazardous compounds.77 “Ma-
jor sources” are groups of stationary sources in neighboring areas
under common control that emit a certain volume of HAPs each
year.78 In contrast, “area sources” are stationary sources that do not
emit significant volumes of HAPs.79 A “stationary source” is any
“building, structure, facility, or installation” that “emits, or may
emit, any air pollutant.”80 Because both classifications are charac-
terized by their contribution of emissions into ambient air, neither
addresses VOC emissions that may create a hazardous indoor
environment when allowed to accumulate.
Although an initial reading of section 112’s purpose demon-
strates Congress’s intent to monitor all dangerous air pollutants,81
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Reitze, supra note 45, at 343 (“[S]tandards for hazardous air pollutants
(HAPs) promulgated pursuant to section 112 also will reduce interstate transport of VOCs
because most organic HAPs are VOCs.”) (footnote omitted).
75. See, e.g., Reitze & Lowell, supra note 70, at 236 (“Very little is known about health
problems, other than cancer, caused by air pollutants, because most testing has been for
carcinogenic properties.”).
76. See supra Part I.B.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1)-(2).
78. Id. § 7412(a)(1) (“[A]ny stationary source or group of stationary sources located within
a contiguous area and under common control that emits ... in the aggregate, 10 tons per year
or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any combination of
hazardous air pollutants.”).
79. Id. § 7412(a)(2). 
80. Id. § 7411(a)(3).
81. See id. § 7412(b)(2) (“[A]dding pollutants which present, or may present, through
inhalation or other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects (including,
but not limited to, substances which are known to be, or may reasonably be anticipated to be,
carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, neurotoxic, which cause reproductive dysfunction, or
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the EPA has only used it to monitor industrial sources.82 The EPA
focuses on contributions to the ambient air stemming from station-
ary industrial sources, such as chemical plants and factories, and
mobile sources, such as automobiles.83 Outside of industrial settings,
the EPA does not regulate indoor air.84 It is clear that under the cur-
rent parameters of the CAA, the EPA cannot monitor indoor VOC
emissions from electronics. A separate federal agency, OSHA, is
generally responsible for indoor air quality standards.
B. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
The United States Department of Labor, through the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (OSH) Act, also monitors VOC levels.85 The
OSH Act authorized the creation of the Occupational Safety &
Health Administration (OSHA), an agency whose purpose is to
“assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
nation safe and healthful working conditions.”86 OSHA does this by
promulgating health standards that create “conditions, or the adop-
tion or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.”87
As such, the legislative intent behind OSHA included the author-
ity to regulate indoor air quality at the work place.88 Encompassed
which are acutely or chronically toxic) or adverse environmental effects whether through
ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation, deposition, or otherwise.”).
82. See An Introduction to Indoor Air Quality, supra note 6.
83. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Sheryl-Lynn Carof, The Legal Control of Indoor Air
Pollution, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 247 (1998).
84. Regulatory Information by Topic, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY http://www2.epa.
gov/regulatory-information-topic/air#indoorair.com [http://perma.cc/L37A-GLDN] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2015) (“EPA does not regulate indoor air, but we do offer assistance in protecting your
indoor air quality.”).
85. See William Cary Wright, Indoor Air Quality Claims: Defining the Practical and Legal
Issues, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 255, 256 (2000). 
86. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012)).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 652 (2012).
88. See Stanley A. Millan, Green Buildings and Plugging the Gaps in Environmental
Laws, 27 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 52 (2013) (“[OSHA] has authority to regulate indoor air in the
work place, but it has limited itself mostly to general duty standards and has specific
standards only for a relatively moderate list of industrial chemicals.”).
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under that authority to promote a safe work place is the regulation
of “toxic materials or harmful physical agents.”89 Although this
authority seems broad, it has been significantly tailored. Currently,
to qualify as a harmful agent, the Secretary of Labor must find that
a compound poses a “significant risk” at “existing exposure levels in
the workplace.”90 OSHA is thereby limited to setting general duty
standards for industrial chemicals.91 Consequently, even if OSHA
monitored VOC emissions from electronics, their supervision would
not extend to nonindustrial settings.
In 1994, OSHA administrators attempted to overcome that strict
regulatory purview by proposing a set of parameters that would
“apply to all indoor ‘nonindustrial work environments.’ ”92 In that
proposal, OSHA acknowledged that “[a]ppliances, office equipment,
and supplies can emit VOCs” and identified a list of products that
contributed to Sick Building Syndrome, as well as other indoor envi-
ronmental illnesses.93 Although that proposal identified specific
VOCs associated with the presence of office appliances, the majority
of that research relied on generalized scientific findings, not definite
VOC emission levels quantified in laboratory settings.94 Regardless,
in 2001, OSHA withdrew the portions of the 1994 proposal related
to VOCs and Sick Building Syndrome, explaining that these pro-
visions had “received little attention during the rulemaking proceed-
ings.”95 Consequently, OSHA does not regulate indoor VOC
emissions from electronics in industrial or nonindustrial settings.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
90. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir. 1992).
91. Today, that list includes over 300 compounds, some of which are VOCs. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1000 (2013).
92. Indoor Air Quality, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968, 15,968 (proposed Apr. 5, 1994) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928).
93. Id. at 15,984 (listing appliances, computer/video display terminals, electrophotograph-
ic printers, and photocopiers as sources of VOCs). 
94. See discussion supra Part I.B.
95. Indoor Air Quality, 66 Fed. Reg. 64,946, 64,946 (Dec. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928). In the withdrawal, OSHA specifically stated, “This docu-
ment does not preclude any agency action that OSHA may find to be appropriate in the
future.” Id. The sections of the proposal that received an enthusiastic response related to
environmental tobacco smoke. Id.
2015] VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUND EMISSIONS REGULATION 1963
C. The Toxic Substances Control Act
The federal government could regulate VOCs through the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), but currently does not.96 The TSCA
gives the EPA authority to regulate chemical compounds that
“present an unreasonable risk of injury to [human] health or the
environment.”97 Provisions of the TSCA further allocate power to the
EPA to do the following: (1) take legal action against mnufacturers,
processors, and distributors of “imminently hazardous chemical sub-
stances;”98 (2) require the same parties to develop data on potential
effects any chemical compound has on human health or the environ-
ment;99 and (3) directly regulate any substance that presents an
unreasonable risk to the same.100 Authorized sanctions range from
requiring the responsible party to place a warning label on their
product, to completely prohibiting a substance’s use.101
Although the potential impact the TSCA could have on indoor
air quality is great, various court decisions and interpretations limit
its application. Thirty-eight years after its adoption, the EPA has
only restricted the use of five chemicals out of almost 80,000 identi-
fied chemicals.102 The EPA’s 1989 attempt to ban asbestos is the
most visible example highlighting the TSCA’s failure to regulate
chemicals.103 In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection
Agency, a manufacturing company that used asbestos in its products
successfully challenged the EPA’s ban on asbestos.104 The Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled against the ban because the EPA had difficulty demon-
strating that asbestos represented an “unreasonable risk” to human
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697 (2012).
97. Id. § 2605(b)(2)(B).
98. Id. § 2606(a).
99. Id. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i).
100. Id. § 2606(b)(1).
101. Id. § 2605(a)(1)-(3).
102. Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Remarks to the Commonwealth
Club of San Francisco (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://perma.cc/PJ54-D94H (“Since 1976,
EPA has issued regulations to control only five existing chemicals determined to present an
unreasonable risk. Five from a total universe of almost 80,000 existing chemicals.”).
103. See, e.g., Jessica N. Schifano et al., The Importance of Implementation in Rethinking
Chemicals Management Policies: The Toxic Substances Control Act, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL.
L. INST.) 10,527, 10,533 (2011).
104. 947 F.2d 1201, 1228 (5th Cir. 1991).
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health and had not considered employing less burdensome alter-
natives.105
Those restrictions directly oppose at least one of the major
motivators behind Congress’s decision to adopt the TSCA: imple-
menting a proactive approach for dealing with the health problems
associated with toxic materials.106 As per the courts, the definition
of “unreasonable” accorded to the TSCA suggests that it either
borders, or is synonymous with, imminently hazardous. This inter-
pretation ignores the concept that the TSCA has a separate section
designated for such substances.107 If the judiciary had adopted a
broader interpretation of the TSCA’s application—for example, one
that recognized the decision to implement the phrases “unreason-
able risk” and “imminently dangerous” in separate sections—then
the EPA might have utilized the TSCA to prohibit the manufacture
of chemicals identified as significant VOC emission sources. Because
even the recognized dangers of asbestos and lead failed to meet the
current necessary level of risk,108 such an attempt would be foregone
and fruitless. This constraint appears puzzling when considering a
statement made by Senator James Pearson, one of the TSCA’s
sponsors: “We can no longer operate under the assumption that
what we do not know about a chemical substance cannot hurt us.
Tragic results associated with too many toxic substances have
taught us that lesson all too well.”109 As such, although the TSCA
does not regulate VOCs, the reasoning behind its adoption demon-
strates a need for a proactive approach to environmental regulation,
particularly to protect public health.
105. Id. at 1229. Since the failed asbestos ban, the EPA has made two subsequent attempts
to restrict chemical use through the TSCA: prohibitions on the use of acrylamide as well as
N-methylachemalide in grout, and lead in fishing sinkers. Neither was finalized. Schifano et
al., supra note 103, at 10,533.
106. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2603 (2012)), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES ACT 760,
783 (1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES ACT] (“[Existing en-
vironmental legislation] generally deal[t] with a problem only after it [ ] manifest[ed]” and the
government “should no longer be limited to repairing [ ] damage after it has been done.”). For
a more detailed elaboration of the legislative shortcomings addressed by the TSCA and its
drafters, see David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key Underlying Assump-
tions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 333, 344 (2010).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(B) (2012).
108. See Schifano et al., supra note 103, at 10,533.
109. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES ACT, supra note 106, at 215.
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D. Summarizing the Inadequacies of Current Regulations
Of the two federal agencies that may regulate VOC emissions, the
EPA has the most power to do so. Unfortunately, the crux of that
power, preventing the creation of ground-level ozone, also forms the
basis of the primary limitation on the possibility of EPA regulated
indoor VOC emissions. If under the CAA, the EPA reclassified VOCs
as a class of criteria pollutants, monitored VOCs more than ambient
air, or considered the harm pollutants may cause in high indoor
concentrations, then there would be less of a need for new VOC
regulations. OSHA’s inability to regulate indoor VOC emissions is
similarly neutered by both statutory interpretation and a restricted
reach—one that only extends to general standards in industrial
settings.
This gap in regulatory authority—the inability of any federal
agency to promulgate environmental standards to protect the
American’s health—can therefore only be filled by new statutory
language. As Congress acknowledged when it passed the TSCA, any
new statutory language providing authority over air quality must
take a proactive approach to protect public health, rather than wait
for an irremediable situation to present itself.110
III. NEW HORIZONS FOR THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The following Part explains which agency is best suited to handle
the newfound responsibility of indoor VOC regulation, outlines the
best example of new statutory language, and explains the suggested
amendment and its significance.
A. Expanding the EPA’s Power
Although the EPA does not currently regulate indoor air quality,
it is the agency best suited for the newfound responsibility. OSHA’s
1994 proposal attempted, but failed, to give OSHA the authority
necessary to promulgate indoor air quality regulations for nonindus-
110. See supra Part II.C.
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trial settings.111 That lackluster reaction could be explained by a
number of factors, including the generality of the scientific research
used in its drafting,112 a general skepticism toward Sick Building
Syndrome,113 or even that the positive public outcry surrounding the
proposal’s other half—environmental tobacco smoke—overshadowed
a less recognized public health risk.114 Regardless of the actual
rationalization, it would be repetitive to make a substantially
similar proposal, even if the corresponding science is now more
definitive in nature.115
A more persuasive route to regulation would be an attempt to
expand the EPA’s power. Unlike OSHA, the EPA already has some
control over VOC emissions from consumer products, demonstrating
Congress’s willingness to grant the EPA discretion in regards to
public health and policy. Additionally, an amendment to the CAA
specifically worded to broaden the EPA’s reach to nonambient,
indoor air would dissolve many of the EPA’s current shortcomings.
As such, an amendment to the CAA providing the basis for the
regulation of VOC emissions from electronics would stand the best
chance of congressional approval.
B. The Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment
1. Proposed Amendment
If passed, the following amendment to the CAA, titled the “Cumu-
latively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment,” would broaden the
purview of the EPA, granting it the authority to promulgate
regulations concerning the effect that VOCs, as well as other cumu-
latively dangerous air pollutants, have on indoor air quality, and
more importantly, public health:
(A) Definitions
For purposes of this section—
111. See Indoor Air Quality, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968, 15,968 (proposed Apr. 5, 1994) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928).
112. See supra Part I.B.
113. See infra Part V.A.2.
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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(1) Electronic appliance: The term “electronic appliance”
means any electrical device listed under subsection (C)
of this section and any other device the Administrator
determines to be a contributor to the concentration of
cumulatively dangerous air pollutants.
(2) Adverse environmental effect: The term “adverse
environmental effect” for this subsection is identical to
that of § 7412 of this Act.116
(3) Cumulatively dangerous air pollutant: The term
“cumulatively dangerous air pollutant” means an air
pollutant that in the judgment of the Administrator
causes, or contributes to, air pollution that may reason-
ably be anticipated to result in an increase in ozone or
other compound that that has an adverse environmental
effect, or that is detrimental to human health when
found in concentrations higher than those anticipated in
healthy surroundings.
(B) Risk and safety assessment
(1) For the purpose of establishing a compound as
cumulatively dangerous, the Administrator shall, within
a reasonable period of time, publish, and from time to
time revise a list, which includes pollutants—
(a) whose presence, after escaping into the ambient
air, contributes to air pollution that may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or public
welfare; and
(b) whose emissions, in the Administrator’s judgment,
cause or contribute to air pollution that may reason-
ably be anticipated to endanger public health in
above-normal indoor concentrations.
The list described under paragraph (1) shall also include
electronic appliances that, in the Administrator’s judg-
ment, are responsible for the emissions of the applicable
cumulatively dangerous air pollutant or pollutants.
(2) If the Administrator finds that—
(a) there is insufficient data to properly determine
whether consumer use of an electronic appliance has
116. “The term ‘adverse environmental effect’ means any significant and widespread
adverse effect, which may reasonably be anticipated, to wildlife, aquatic life, or other natural
resources, including adverse impacts on populations of endangered or threatened species or
significant degradation of environmental quality over broad areas.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(7)
(2012).
1968 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1947
a detrimental effect as described in section (B)(1); and
that
(b) additional monitoring and testing is required to
make such determinations;
The Administrator shall by rule require that testing be
conducted with the relevant electronic appliance and
that the manufacturer develop the appropriate emis-
sions data.
(C) Testing and data collection requirements
(1) If the Administrator makes a determination under
paragraph (B)(2), the Administrator shall by rule
require that testing be conducted on such electronic
appliance or its component parts to develop data with
respect to the health and environmental effects for
which there is an insufficiency of data and experience
and which are relevant to the determination that use of
such appliances does or does not present a risk of an
adverse environmental effect or injury to health.
(2) In determining the standards to be met under this
section, the Administrator shall consider the relative
costs of the various test protocols and methodologies
that may be required under the rule.
(3) The following persons shall be required to conduct
tests and submit data in accordance with this section—
(a) each person who manufactures, intends to manu-
facture, distributes, or intends to distribute the
corresponding electronic appliance, or
(b) each person who manufactures, or intends to
manufacture component parts of electronic appli-
ances.
(4) If additional data is developed as provided by sub-
section (C)(3)(b), then the standards enumerated in
subsection (C)(2) must be met for each component part
in an electronic appliance’s construction unless other-
wise exempted by the Administrator under this Act.
(D) Sanctions
(1) If the Administrator makes a determination under
paragraph (B)(1), the Administrator shall, by consent
agreement or order, as appropriate—
(a) prohibit manufacture of the appliance, or prohibit
manufacture without compliance with restrictions
specified in the relevant order; or
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(b) issue a suspension of future production of that
appliance, for a reasonable time, to notify and give
the affected manufacturer an opportunity to lower the
relevant cumulatively dangerous air pollutant emis-
sions; or
(c) require that the appliance be marked with, or
accompanied by, clear and adequate warnings and
instructions with respect to proper and safe use, the
form and content of this material will be prescribed
and approved by the Administrator.
(E) Appeals and applications for exemption to the Administrator
(1) A manufacturer, or similar party, may appeal the
Administrator’s classification within twelve (12) months
after he has been notified of the results of the Adminis-
trator’s safety assessment and accompanying sanctions.
Such an appeal is only appropriate if the appealing
party has reason to believe that the manufactured
appliance does not emit the identified cumulatively
dangerous air pollutant or that the imposed sanction is
not economically or technologically reasonable.
(2) Any person required by rule under this Act to con-
duct tests and submit data on an electronic appliance or
its component parts may apply to the Administrator (in
such form and manner as the Administrator shall pre-
scribe) for an exemption from such requirement.
(a) An exemption should be granted if, upon receipt of
an application under paragraph (2), the Administra-
tor finds that—
(i) the electronic appliance or component part with
respect to which such application was submitted is
equivalent to an electronic appliance or component
part for which data has previously been submitted
to the Administrator in accordance with this Act,
and
(ii) submission of data by the applicant for such
electronic appliance or component part would be
duplicative of the previously submitted data.
(b) If the exemption under paragraph (2) is granted
on the basis of the existence of previously submitted
tests and data and such exemption is granted during
the reimbursement period (to be determined by the
Administrator), then unless such applicant and the
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parties responsible for the submission of the data de-
scribed in paragraph (2)(a)(i) reach a private under-
standing, the Administrator shall order the person
granted the exemption to provide fair and equitable
reimbursement, in an amount determined under
rules of the Administrator, to the party whose data
provided the basis for the exemption.
2. Commentary on the Proposed Amendment
Following the structure of the CAA, section A of this proposed
Amendment gives the definitions of relevant key phrases, including
two that are not currently codified.117 The first of those phrases,
“electronic appliance,” has a considerably broader definition than
similar labels found within the Act.118 This latitude permits the EPA
to regulate any electronic device, including those in nonindustrial
and industrial settings. The second phrase, “cumulatively dangerous
air pollutant,” has a similarly expansive definition to address both
the negative effect compounds have on ambient air,119 as well as
indoor air quality. The breadth of those definitions is significant
because the language provides the EPA with the necessary legisla-
tive framework to regulate more than the traditionally protected
ambient air, signaling a transition into currently nonregulated in-
door environments. As emphasized above, there is a substantial
need to begin monitoring indoor air quality because of the over-
whelming amount of time Americans now spend surrounded by four
walls.120
Statutes themselves rarely set out specific criteria used to
determine proper scientific procedures or safe pollutant exposure
levels.121 Instead, they provide general time requirements and
117. “Adverse environmental effect” is afforded the same definition applicable under 42
U.S.C. § 7412.
118. See, e.g., id. § 7412(a)(8) (defining “electric utility steam generating unit” as “any fossil
fuel fired combustion unit of more than 25 megawatts that serves a generator that produces
electricity for sale.”).
119. See supra Part II.A.1.
120. See supra Part I.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1) (“In general: The Administrator shall promulgate
regulations establishing emission standards for categories and subcategories of sources
initially listed for regulation ... as expeditiously as practicable.”); id. § 7619(b)(2)(A) (“Proposed
regulations: Not later than March 1, 2006, after consultation with Federal land managers and
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procedural overviews, leaving the precise logistics of risk and safety
assessments to the party most capable of identifying them—the
agency that will promulgate the resulting regulations.122 As such,
section B(1), modeled largely after section 7511 of the CAA,123
follows that precedent by giving the Administrator of the EPA the
authority to decide the parameters for the risk and safety assess-
ment.
The phrase “may reasonably be anticipated” is also embedded in
section B(1). Seemingly immaterial, this language is important
because one of the many restrictions on regulations safeguarding
public health is that the regulatory agency must show that a
significant or imminent risk is present to justify the imposed
regulation.124 Yet, such standards are counterproductive to encour-
aging a proactive approach to handling any situation. Lowering that
standard makes the prima facie showing for classification of a
cumulatively dangerous air pollutant less burdensome, and imple-
menting the necessary proactive approach becomes considerably
less difficult.
That subsection further allows the EPA to develop a list of
cumulatively dangerous air pollutants, as well as the electronic
appliances responsible for their emissions. If the EPA Administrator
lacks adequate knowledge to include an electronic appliance on said
list, section B(2) permits the promulgation of rules that require
manufacturer testing to aid in that determination. Once again, this
agency action mirrors the authority granted to the EPA by the
TSCA.125 The guidelines for these tests, reflecting the tradition of
providing general authority and procedural overviews, are given in
section C.126 In addition to that broad language, section C also
provides that private parties may opt to test specific component
parts of an electronic appliance—rather than the appliance itself.
This avenue is provided so that manufacturers may choose to iden-
tify materials that are exempt from the Amendment and proceed to
State air pollution control agencies, the Administrator shall publish in the Federal Register
proposed regulations governing the review and handling of air quality monitoring data
influenced by exceptional events.”). 
122. See sources cited supra note 121.
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511.
124. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2012).
126. Id. § 2603(b)(3).
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take advantage of the exemption process described in the Amend-
ment’s final section.
Section D lists the types of sanctions the EPA may impose upon
manufacturers of appliances. They are nearly identical to those
found in the TSCA,127 and are therefore presumably within the
realm of accepted regulatory action. Particularly imperative is the
imposition of clear and adequate warning labels and safe-use
instructions. All of the negative health effects associated with VOC
exposure result from prolonged contact with high concentrations of
the compounds.128 Warnings and instructions explaining safe proce-
dures for use—even simple suggestions such as adequate room
ventilation—would have a substantial impact on the prevalence of
the identified health effects. In contrast, the threat of a complete
ban on manufacturing was not included in the amendment because
of a high likelihood of effectiveness. Rather, it was included to
reinforce the impression of fairness when the EPA employs one of
the other authorized sanctions.
The last sanction, an order suspending future production, serves
the same purpose as the appeals process described in section E—
creating an incentive or opportunity to force manufacturers to
contemplate the potential harm their products may cause to the
public. The suspension of future production does this by notifying
the manufacturer that in a reasonable amount of time it must stop
production of the identified product unless it has improved the level
of cumulatively dangerous air pollutants the product emits during
normal use. That order is intended to force the manufacturer to
engage in research and development, including conducting its own
analysis as to what component parts are the source of the air quality
problem. Similarly, during the appeals process, the manufacturer
must conduct its own investigation to successfully challenge the
disputed sanction. Both courses of action serve the same purpose,
establishing a proactive approach to monitoring indoor air quality
to the benefit of public health.
Section E also provides an opportunity for manufacturers to apply
for an exemption from the Amendment’s data collection require-
ments while promoting cost effective research and business
127. See id. § 2605(a)-(c).
128. See supra Part I.
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practices. Akin to the exemption detailed in the TSCA, section E
provides manufacturers with several important opportunities. First,
it allows the manufacturers of new or untested electronic appliances
to bypass any lengthy testing periods by taking advantage of
preexisting research. Second, it allows manufacturers who have
complied with the Administrator’s rules to regain a portion of their
expenditures. Lastly, it promotes manufacturer use of preapproved,
consumer-friendly component parts. Section E does this by
incentivizing the development of a preapproved materials list that
manufacturers may use to create future electronic appliances—
thereby entirely avoiding regulation of cumulatively dangerous air
pollutants.
IV. INDOOR AIR QUALITY REGULATION WOULD BENEFIT PUBLIC
HEALTH WHILE ENCOURAGING INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION
If passed, the Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment
would positively affect public health and productivity, motivate in-
dustrial actors to develop safer technologies, and substantiate
current state and private interest attempts to improve indoor envi-
ronments.
A. A Healthier, More Industrious Population
By reducing the concentrations of VOCs and other cumulatively
dangerous air pollutants found in indoor environments, the EPA
would promote the health of citizens and improve productivity. In
OSHA’s 1994 proposal to regulate air quality in nonindustrial work
environments, the Agency examined the medical and economic
impact that negative indoor air quality had on the nonindustrial
American workforce.129 As part of that examination, OSHA investi-
gated the frequency that the pertinent employee populations
suffered from respiratory complications and debilitating head-
aches.130 It found that 85 out of every 1000 employees developed
severe upper respiratory symptoms that required medical attention
129. Indoor Air Quality, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968 (proposed Apr. 5, 1994) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928).
130. Id.
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and that 57 out of every 1000 employees suffered from severe
headaches that either required the same or that resulted in restric-
ted daily activity levels.131 Furthermore, the proposal explained that
if OSHA could mitigate those adverse health effects, increases in
employee productivity and customer satisfaction would result in as
much as a $15 billion increase in profits for the affected indus-
tries.132
As previously mentioned, the dangers of overexposure to VOCs
include more than just respiratory complications and headaches.133
Even though no studies have quantified the economic benefit that
would result from a decrease in the many symptoms that result
from VOC exposure, it seems reasonable to assume that a reduction
in VOC-associated symptoms would result in an equal, if not
greater, economic benefit to industries. For example, a study con-
ducted in 1997 estimated the potential profit margin for American
industry that would result from generally improved indoor air
quality.134 The researchers responsible for that study assessed po-
tential values for decreases in respiratory disease, reduced asthma
risk, reduced Sick Building Syndrome symptoms, and benefits from
direct improvements in performance unrelated to worker health,
and ultimately projected a potential annual savings and productiv-
ity gain of $28 to $168 billion for American industries.135
Although neither study directly comments on the impact that
high concentrations of VOCs have on productivity, they are demon-
strative of the potential monetary gain industries may experience
after transitioning to a healthy indoor environment. This argument
is especially persuasive when comparing the scope of the two
projections—application to nonindustrial work environments and
application to all industrial environments136—to the scope of the
Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment—application to
all indoor environments.137 Regulation of all indoor environments
131. Id. at 15,997.
132. Id. at 16,012.
133. See supra Part I.
134. William J. Fisk & Arthur H. Rosenfeld, Estimates of Improved Productivity and Health
from Better Indoor Environments, 7 INDOOR AIR 158, 158, 168-69 (1997).
135. Id. at 169.
136. Indoor Air Quality, 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,968-69 (“The provisions of the standard are
proposed to apply to all indoor ‘nonindustrial work environments.’”).
137. See supra Part III.B.
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would most likely prove to be more beneficial than OSHA’s projec-
tion and, potentially, fall within or supersede the spectrum offered
in the 1997 study.
B. Encouraging Innovation and Efficiency
At its core, the amendment proposed in this Note illustrates the
most direct and common form of environmental law—prescriptive
regulation.138 Prescriptive regulations tell actors what is and is not
permissible in certain contexts.139 For example, Congress required
states to regulate air pollution according to federal specifications
through the CAA, thereby telling states what level of ambient air
pollution was, and was not, permissible.140 Yet, the efficiency of
prescriptive regulations is debatable.141 Some experts believe that
they stifle innovation by disincentivizing progress—once an actor
achieves the bare minimum of compliance, there is no motivation to
go any further in regards to research, development, or control.142
The optimistic view of prescriptive regulation argues that strict
prescriptive regulation has the potential to encourage production
process and design innovation, resulting in an increase in efficiency
and productivity.143 Because portions of the Cumulatively Danger-
ous Air Pollutant Amendment, specifically the temporary suspen-
sion and appeals process, are designed to force manufacturer
research, the Amendment encourages the development and use of
materials that emit lower levels of pollutants as component parts for
138. See James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The
Five P’s, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 364-65 (2013). 
139. Id.
140. See supra Part II.A.
141. See Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of Command-and-Control
Environmental Regulation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 223 (2005) (criticizing the
ineffectiveness of over forty years of prescriptive environmental regulations); see also William
F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (1981).
142. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (arguing for a more nuanced regulatory system); Howard Latin,
Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-
Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1331 (1985) (arguing that although
flawed, prescriptive environmental regulation is the most effective); Cass R. Sunstein,
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 420-21 (1990) (arguing that
“promoting good control technology” discourages progress).
143. Salzman, supra note 138, at 365-66.
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electronics and other appliances in the future, exemplifying the
second view of prescriptive regulation.
As mentioned earlier in this Note, Congress has already adopted
the position that the government must abandon its antiquated
approach of dealing with environmental problems only after they
emerge in force.144 Despite that decades-old call to action over forty
years ago, environmental regulations have remained unchanged—
legislation is still primarily drafted in response to whichever pol-
lution source or climate change is prevalent in the media.145 If
adopted, the Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment
would mark an end to that era, as it would signify a renewed
attempt to prevent air pollution, not simply a mad scramble to
stabilize an undesirable situation.
C. Substantiating State and Private Interest Attempts
The Amendment would substantiate state and private interest
attempts to regulate indoor air quality and VOCs. Thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have guidelines regulating
indoor air quality standards.146 The scope of those regulations range
from investigating illnesses and outbreaks whose suspected cause
is poor indoor air quality to establishing an advisory council respon-
sible for developing statewide indoor air quality standards.147 Many
of the state statutes are specifically geared toward indoor air quality
in schools,148 perhaps because youths are seen as particularly
vulnerable to environmental pollutants.149 If passed, this Note’s
proposed amendment would further the interests of those statutes
by preventing air pollutant emissions from appliances. Prohibition
of those appliances, or a reduction in VOC emissions, would also aid
144. See supra Part II.C. 
145. See Markell, supra note 106, at 346. 
146. A March 2015 Westlaw search for indoor air quality regulations showed thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have guidelines in place.
147. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-413 (West 2013); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 87/15 (2014); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2165.304 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.162.020 (West 2013).
148. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2-121 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.162.050 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-9E-5 (West 2013).
149. See William W. Nazaroff, Exploring the Consequences of Climate Change for Indoor
Air Quality, ENVTL. RES. LETTER, Jan.-Mar. 2013, at 1, 4 (“Subpopulations that are potentially
vulnerable to climate-changed-induced impacts on indoor environmental quality include ...
[the] young, [or] old.”).
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in the private certification of environmentally sustainable “green”
buildings.150 A number of organizations have issued guides for green
building and emphasized the impact that indoor air quality can
have on human health.151 Some, including the U.S. Green Building
Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED),
require that the products used by the construction industry, and
even the furnishings of completed buildings, consist of components
that emit low levels of VOCs.152 The proposed statutory amendment
would substantially increase the number of industries affected by
VOC regulation, as well as the corresponding financial burden.
V. INDUSTRIAL OPPOSITION AND CHALLENGES TO THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENT
As the purpose of the Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant
Amendment is to provide the EPA with the authority to promulgate
regulations on VOC emissions from electronics, it faces two sets of
obstacles. The first and most immediate set consists of those present
during Congress’s deliberations. The second set, looking to the fu-
ture, would be present after the EPA promulgated and implemented
the corresponding regulations. The following section addresses
examples of both sets of obstacles.
A. Obstacles to Passing the Amendment
The Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment would
first encounter challenges during Congress’s consideration. This
Section identifies and addresses those challenges.
150. The EPA has defined “Green Building” as “the practice of creating structures and
using processes that are environmentally responsible and resource-efficient throughout a
building’s life-cycle from siting to design, construction, operation, maintenance, renovation
and deconstruction.” Green Building: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/pubs/about.htm [http://perma.cc/PQ4D-CM46] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2015).
151. Examples of such organizations include BREEAM, CASBEE, Built Green, Green
Globes, and Green Star. See Millan, supra note 88, at 44 n. 5.
152. U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION & MAJOR RENOVA-
TIONS VERSION 2.2, at 65-69 (2005), available at http://perma.cc/SCL8-UURH.
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1. Tangled Political Strings
Although the intricacies of congressional decision making are
beyond the scope of this Note, nearly all proposed legislation faces
opposition from the industries it will affect. Industries influence
lawmakers by winning over their constituents.153 As Jack Gerard,
a top lobbyist for the American Petroleum Institute, recently noted,
“Congress is responsive to the American people.”154 Public approval
has correlated with the successful passage of a number of statutes
and amendments despite industrial opposition. The tobacco industry
failed to prevent the imposition of the Surgeon General’s Warn-
ing,155 and recently, graphic warnings on cigarette packaging.156
Similarly, the automobile and coal industries unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the 1990 CAA Amendments, which increased national
restrictions on carbon emissions.157 If the determinative factor of
success for proposed legislation is public support, the Cumulatively
Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment would most likely be unsuc-
cessful because concern for indoor air quality is relatively new.
Yet Congressional ratification does not necessarily turn on public
outcry. For example, the Meat and Poultry Pathogen Reduction and
Enforcement Act of 2003 (commonly referred to as Kevin’s Law)
garnered widespread support due to both media coverage and its
sentimental origins.158 However, lobbying from the corporate meat
153. See Steven Mufson, Jack Gerard, the Force Majeure Behind Big Oil, WASH. POST
(Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/jack-gerard-the-force-
majeure-behind-big-oil/2012/04/06/gIQA1hjC0S_story.html [http://perma.cc/74AY-L6FP].
154. Id. 
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
156. See Steven Reinberg, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to New Cigarette Labeling,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 22, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/
news/articles/2013/04/22/us-supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-new-cigarette-labeling
[http://perma.cc/WG6U-CBBW]. Despite the successful passing of the Family Smoking and
Tobacco Prevention Act, the graphic warning label requirement is in dispute. Compare R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the graphic
warnings violated the First Amendment), with Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674
F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (ruling the labeling requirements were permissible).
157. See Thomas O. McGarity, EPA at Helm’s Deep: Surviving the Fourth Attack on
Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 210 (2013).
158. Elizabeth Becker, Parents of Sickened Children Ask for Tighter Rules on Food, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at A22; FOOD, INC. (Magnolia Pictures 2009). Informally named after
Kevin Kowalcyk, a two-year-old who died after eating meat contaminated with E. coli, the Act
proposed legislation that would strengthen the federal government’s ability to prevent
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industry successfully stopped, or at least stalled, congressional
approval of the Act.159 Even though no combination of factors can
guarantee the successful adoption of proposed statutes or amend-
ments, Congress appears to readily embrace legislation intended to
protect public health from the adverse effects of air pollution, such
as the Amendment proposed in this Note.160
2. Controversies Surrounding Air Quality Cases
Opponents to the proposed Amendment might also deter Congress
by claiming it was motivated by “junk science.” Indoor air quality
claims have a history of controversial diagnoses and low success
rates. By far, the most controversial diagnosis relating to air quality
is Multiple Chemical Sensitivity (MCS).161 Health organizations
worldwide have conducted extensive and systematic evaluations
regarding the validity of MCS diagnoses.162 To date, none of them
have found convincing evidence to support the basis of MCS
claims.163 Practitioners who believe in its existence describe it as an
“environmental intolerance” triggered by stress, fungal infections,
viral infections, and cumulative exposure to a plethora of low-level
environmental toxic substances.164 “[I]n the United States, the
chemically sensitive have been granted disability status” in certain
jurisdictions, but MCS is not a recognized medical diagnosis.165 This
contaminated meat from reaching consumers. Becker, supra.
159. See Becker, supra note 158; FOOD, INC., supra note 158.
160. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
161. The label MCS was first used in 1987 by Mark Cullen, an American occupational
physician. Mark R. Cullen, The Worker With Multiple Chemical Sensitivities: An Overview,
2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 655, 655 (1987). He used it to describe an emerging condition that he
observed in workers exposed to chemicals at factories and similar buildings. Id.
162. See generally Donald J. McGraw, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities, 53 J. OCCUPATIONAL
& ENVTL. MED. 103, 104 (2011) (listing the Ministry of Health of the Province of Ontario,
Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association, American Academy of
Allergy, Asthma and Immunology, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, World Health
Organization, International Society of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, American
Council on Science and Health, Royal College of Physicians, and Royal College of Pathologists
as having evaluated the basis of MCS claims). 
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Tarryn Phillips, “I Never Wanted to be a Quack!” The Professional Deviance of Plaintiff
Experts in Contested Illness Lawsuits: The Case of Multiple Chemical Sensitivities, 24 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 182, 184 (2010). Other countries such as Australia do not recognize MCS
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status might explain why OSHA ignored its existence in the 1994
proposal discussed above.
MCS, however, is not the only air quality related claim. In
contrast to MCS, Building Related Illness (BRI) is widely accepted
within medical, as well as scientific, communities, and is clinically
defined as an illness that can be traced to a specific source in a
building.166 Legionnaire’s Disease is the emblematic example of a
BRI,167 but the label also encompasses asbestosis (a condition that
results from asbestos exposure) bronchitis, and even asthma.168
Somewhat less accepted, but still recognized, is Sick Building Syn-
drome (SBS).169 Interestingly, although doctors do not attribute a
single cause to the onset of SBS symptoms,170 they have identified
VOCs as a contributing factor.171 Regardless, the substance of the
Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment would not be
rooted in MCS, BRI, or SBS claims. Instead the Amendment would
use them as historical background to aid in the explanation of the
origins of contemporary research that, as explained above, corre-
lates the presence of VOCs to specific negative health effects.
in any form, while others such as Germany and Austria consider it only as a valid
physiological diagnosis. Id. at 183-84.
166. Loewy et al., supra note 26, at 245-46.
167. The first documented case of Legionnaires Disease occurred in 1976 when American
Legionnaires contracted a mysterious illness, whose symptoms included pneumonia and high
fevers, after leaving a Philadelphia hotel. See Lawrence K. Altman, 20 Flu-Like Deaths in
Pennsylvania, 155 Ill, a Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1976, at A1. Scientists identified the
responsible bacterium six months after the initial outbreak, concluding that the illness had
spread through the hotel’s air-conditioning system. See Lawrence K. Altman, In Philadelphia
30 Years Ago, an Eruption of Illness and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at F1.
168. Wright, supra note 85, at 255.
169. See supra notes 26-29. Specific symptoms associated with sick buildings include nose,
throat and eye irritation; fatigue and irritability; asthma or asthma-like reactions; chest tight-
ness; wheezing; dry skin and gastrointestinal problems. See WHO REG’L OFFICE FOR EUR.
COPENHAGEN, INDOOR AIR QUALITY: BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINANTS 8-10 (1988) available at
http://perma.cc/QSP9-ZZUJ.
170. Andrea Apter et al., Epidemiology of the Sick Building Syndrome, 94 J. ALLERGY &
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 277, 284 (1994).
171. See William J. Mitchell, CGL Pollution Exclusion Provisions and the Sick Building
Syndrome: Despite Valiant Rewriting Efforts, Pollution Exclusions, Absolute or Not, Do Not
Always Preclude Liability for a Variety of Ills, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 124, 124 (1999). Correlations
have also been found linking synthetic compounds, radon, and biological sources to SBS
symptoms. Id. at 126.
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B. Possible Challenges to Future Regulations
Independent of the obstacles to passing an amendment are the
future challenges that could be made against the Amendment once
it is passed. The text below acknowledges and dismisses potential
counterarguments to the regulations the EPA would promulgate if
Congress passed the Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amend-
ment.
1. Lack of Significant Risk
The lack of severity in the side effects from the regulated activity
is one counter argument to any health-related regulation. Specific
to possible regulations resulting from the Cumulatively Dangerous
Air Pollutant Amendment, challengers could claim that the negative
health effects correlated with overexposure to VOCs are either too
tenuous or not serious enough to constitute government regulation.
In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit struck down
the EPA-imposed ban on asbestos, ruling that the agency had not
demonstrated that asbestos use posed an “unreasonable risk” to the
public.172 Not all courts hold air quality regulations to such high
standards. In fact, in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene case), the Supreme Court
recognized an example of a less stringent standard.173 In the
Benzene case, the Court made the following statement regarding the
phrase “requirement reasonably necessary or appropriate”:
It is [OSHA’s] responsibility to determine in the first instance
what it considers to be a “significant” risk. Some risks are
plainly acceptable and others are plainly unacceptable. If, for
example, the odds are one in a billion that person will die from
cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated water, the risk clearly
could not be considered significant. On the other hand, if the
odds are one in a thousand that inhalation of gasoline vapors
that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might
172. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1981); supra
Part II.C.
173. 448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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well consider the risk significant and take the appropriate steps
to decrease or eliminate it.174
The reasonableness standard enunciated by the Court is much
easier for an agency to satisfy than the “unreasonable risk” stan-
dard articulated by the Fifth Circuit, and hinges on the relevant
statutory language.
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan (the
Cotton Dust case) is another Supreme Court decision that addressed
the severity of symptoms relating to air quality regulations.175 In
that case, the Court concluded that OSHA had the authority to
impose regulations on the cotton industry. OSHA promulgated the
regulations in an effort to prevent Byssinosis, a respiratory disease,
even though there was “some uncertainty over the manner in which
the disease progresse[d] from its least serious to its disabling
grades.”176 Byssinosis is rarely deadly, and in its most frequent form
has mild symptoms.177 Similarly, federal regulation of formaldehyde
was promulgated to primarily avoid sensory irritation,178 another
example of the public being protected from non-life threatening
health effects. Although critics argue that the severity of the
symptoms is most important in a judicial challenge to regulation, it
appears that courts emphasize the germaneness of the legislative
language, the possibility that the pertinent agency is overstepping
its allotted power, and the existence of a causal link between the
regulated substance and specific symptoms.
2. Technological and Economic Feasibility
Critics of potential regulations could also claim that prohibiting
continued manufacture of certain products, or requiring the
placement of a warning label, would place an unreasonable techno-
logical or economic burden on certain industries. Once more, using
Corrosion Proof Fittings as an example, courts have struck down
174. Id. at 655.
175. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 495-98 (1981).
176. Id. at 497.
177. Indoor Air Quality, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,001 (proposed Apr. 5, 1994) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928).
178. Id.
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regulations when the agency in question failed to consider less bur-
densome alternatives.179 The less burdensome alternatives standard
originates from interpretations of the CAA180 and the OSH Act.181
Technological and economic feasibility are both governed by the
same definition,182 “capable of being done, executed, or effected.”183
Central to this counterargument is that the agency imposing the
regulation carries the burden of showing, by substantial evidence,
that the standard is actually feasible.184 The “substantial evidence”
standard is not insurmountable; the agency does not have to prove
feasibility beyond scientific certainty.185 Additionally, agencies are
allowed to “raise standards which require improvements in existing
technologies or which require the development of new technology,
and [are] not limited to issuing standards based solely on devices
already fully developed.”186
Specific to the sanctions authorized by the Cumulatively Danger-
ous Air Pollutant Amendment, warning labels have been used to
warn consumers of dangerous pollutant emissions for decades and
would most likely not be considered an undue economic or techno-
logical burden.187 Additionally, the exemption provided by the
Amendment actually encourages a crescendo of economic feasibility,
spreading the initial burden that manufacturers encounter among
179. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1228 (5th Cir. 1991).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he degree of emission limitation achievable
through the application of the best system of emission reduction [ ] (taking into account the
cost of achieving such reduction)”); id. § 7475(a)(4) (“[T]he best available control technology
for each pollutant.”). The OSH Act uses similar language. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2012)
(explaining that the EPA must consider “all relevant aspects of the risk [and] a comparison
of the estimated costs of complying with actions taken under this chapter”).
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2012) (explaining that OSHA must ensure “to the extent
feasible,” that exposure to hazards in the workplace does not harm workers’ health).
182. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir. 1992).
183. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981) (quoting WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 831 (1976)).
184. See United Steel Workers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“OSHA’s
duty is to show that modern technology has at least conceived some industrial strategies or
devices which are likely to be capable of meeting the [standard] and which the industries are
generally capable of adopting.”).
185. Id. (“[A] standard is obviously not infeasible solely because OSHA has no hard
evidence to show that the standard has been met.”).
186. Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1975).
187. See AM. LUNG ASS’N ET AL., supra note 18, at 13 (explaining that many items that emit
VOCs “carry precautionary labels specifying risks and procedures for safe use”).
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their contemporaries and promoting safer and more efficient pro-
duct technologies.
The potential ban on a product’s manufacture is therefore the
penalty most vulnerable to feasibility criticisms. However, the
likelihood of the imposition of a complete ban is extremely unlikely.
More probable would be the suspension of future production of a
product line. In this way, instead of permanently discontinuing a
product’s manufacture, the EPA would be giving the affected party
a reasonable amount of time to identify the components of the
appliance responsible for the emissions and to redesign them to
comply with the new CAA standards.188 This allotted time for re-
search and development is the equivalent of raising the standards
for existing technologies,189 making them safer for consumer use
without constituting an immediate burden on the economy. In fact,
researchers have estimated “that the potential financial benefits of
improving indoor environments exceed costs by a factor of 18 to
47.”190
Like all new statutory language, counterarguments can be made
against the Cumulatively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment;
however, economic efficiency is a particularly important consider-
ation. To completely understand the impact of the new statutory
language, a multitude of factors would need to be balanced: with one
decision, Congress could give the EPA authority to promote health-
ier indoor environments, increase work efficiency, and promote
innovation; and on the other hand, Congress could deny the EPA
that power, choosing instead to shy away from a spike in immediate
manufacturing and research costs. This Note argues that, ulti-
mately, economic efficiency would weigh in favor of the amend-
ment’s passage and longevity.
CONCLUSION
Concern for the air outside of buildings has traditionally been at
the forefront of environmental disputes—resulting in blockbuster
188. This expectation would be permissible “[s]o long as it presents substantial evidence
that companies acting vigorously and in good faith can develop the technology.” United Steel
Workers, 647 F.2d at 1264.
189. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190. Fisk & Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 158.
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films,191 the creation of a national holiday,192 and federal legisla-
tion.193 Prior to the 1980s, that narrow focus might have been
justified. Yet in 1989, Americans spent 90 percent of their time
indoors.194 That year, only 15 percent of households in the United
States had a computer.195 As of 2012, twenty-five years later, over
78.9 percent of households have at least one computer, if not
more.196 It seems more than likely that the Americans spend more
time indoors now than ever been before.
Recognizing this shift in American activity, the scientific commu-
nity began conducting indoor air quality research in the 1980s.
Through the years, those studies have progressed from producing
generalized findings regarding Sick Building Syndrome, to specific
quantifications demonstrating exact VOC emission levels from
electronics and other indoor appliances. Additional research demon-
strated that human exposure to high concentrations of VOCs can
result in a wide spectrum of negative health effects, ranging from
headaches to death.
Unfortunately, the legal community has failed to keep pace with
both the habits of the average American, as well as the described
scientific findings. Today, the agency with the most regulatory pow-
er over VOCs, the EPA, does not regulate indoor air quality. OSHA,
the only other agency to regulate indoor VOCs, merely promulgates
standards for air quality in industrialized settings. The Cumula-
tively Dangerous Air Pollutant Amendment, proposed in this Note,
addresses that impermissible gap by expanding the EPA’s regula-
tory authority to indoor settings, thereby bridging the disconnect
between outdoor emissions and appliances in industrial, as well as
nonindustrial settings. If successfully executed, the new statutory
191. See, e.g., AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Lawrence Bender Productions 2006); THE LORAX
(Universal Pictures 2012).
192. See Earth Day: The History of A Movement, EARTH DAY NETWORK, http://www.earth
day.org/earth-day-history-movement [http://perma.cc/E6WE-7TG8] (last visited Mar. 14,
2015).
193. See supra Part II.A.
194. OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, supra note 11, at i.
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language would exemplify the proactive approach necessary to
protect public health—resulting in a healthier, more industrious
population and a more efficient, innovative commercial market.
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